The promise of a better future: ECOSOCC in theoretical perspective by Marty, R.
1 
 
  
2 
 
 
The Promise of a Better Future:  
ECOSOCC in Theoretical Perspective 
Written by Rachel Marty 
Student no. s0809055 
 
 
 
Thesis for the Master of Political Science, Leiden University 
Thesis supervisor: Dr. Theresa S. Reinold 
Submitted on Monday, June 8th 2015 
Word count (excluding appendix and literature): 17.901 
  
Abstract 
The research question central in this thesis is ‘which theoretical perspective best explains the creation of the 
Economic, Cultural and Social Council in the African Union?’. In order to answer the question, three different 
perspectives, each originating from a different theoretical school of thought, are used in a case study design. 
Each of the theories employ different assumptions in order to describe why certain thing happen and others 
don’t. Neorealism is based on assumptions of an anarchic world in which self-interested states compete for 
power, and that their position in the international structure is what defines the behavior of states. In contrast, 
the social constructivist view assumes that it is not the need for power, but norms and the logic of 
appropriateness that shape state behavior. Finally, sociological institutionalism assumes that global cultures 
shape how states present themselves, but that decoupling between rhetoric and practice is a necessary 
consequence because national and global cultures do not fit correctly. The observations drawn from the case 
study show little support for the social constructivist perspective but much support for the other two theories 
as explanations for the creation of ECOSOCC. However, the theories need not be regarded as contradictory but 
rather as complementary perspectives which employ different levels of analysis. Together, neorealism and 
sociological institutionalism seem to best explain the creation of ECOSOCC in the African Union. 
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1. Introduction 
The transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) was met 
with great enthusiasm from politicians, civil society and some scholars alike. The AU was to 
evolve far further than just being a successor of the OAU. Indeed, it included far-reaching 
objectives and principles showing great promise for the integration, development and 
democratization of the African continent. One of the new principles described in the AU 
Constitutive Act was the intent of becoming a people-driven organization. One of the 
institutions created to fulfill this aim was the Economic, Cultural and Social Council (ECOSOCC), 
established in Article 22 of the AU Constitutive Act. 
But ECOSOCC has received much criticism in the past few years, and many have conveyed that 
the institution is ineffective. Concerns have even been expressed that the institution might 
never fulfill its intended role as a representative for the African People in the AU (Gyimah-
Baodi 1996, 117-8; Moyo 2008, 275-8). These observations give rise to questions concerning 
the motives behind the creation of ECOSOCC. An approach to identify and perhaps even 
understand the underlying motives for the creation of ECOSOCC, is the application of 
International Relations Theory frameworks. Applying this method in order to gain insight into 
ECOSOCC will form the focus of this thesis. More specifically, the research question for this 
thesis is as follows:  
Which theoretical perspective best explains the creation of the Economic, Cultural and Social 
Council in the African Union? 
In order to answer the research question, the theoretical frameworks of neorealism, social 
constructivism and sociological institutionalism will be used to develop six different 
hypothesis to be subsequently tested in a case study of ECOSOCC.  
First, chapter 2 will offer a case description and describe how the African Union evolved in 
Africa and in what context ECOSOCC was created. Chapter 3 offers a theoretical framework 
and contemplates the three theories of neorealism, social constructivism and sociological 
institutionalism, provides their assumptions and introduces the hypothesis derived from the 
theory. The methodology, including an overview of the methods of analysis and the 
operationalization of the variables will be presented in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 5 applies the theoretical frameworks to the case and tests the assumptions of the 
subsequent theories in order to determine whether the presented hypothesis are supported 
by the findings, before discussing these findings and answering the research question in 
chapter 6. Finally, chapter 7 presents a summary of the findings. 
The analysis will show that there is little support for understanding the creation of ECOSOCC 
through the social constructivist perspective. However, both neorealism and sociological 
institutionalism seem to be appropriate models for explaining the motives driving the 
establishment of ECOSOCC. Instead of presenting contradictory perspectives, these two 
frameworks offer the possibility of complementary use, as both focus on different levels of 
analysis. The paper concludes with the assertion that the creation of ECOSOCC can best be 
explained by a combination of neorealism and sociological institutionalism.   
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2. Case description 
In order to provide the context for this research, this chapter will offer the background 
information on the Economic, Social and Cultural Council required for the research in this 
paper. To this end, not only ECOSOCC itself is considered, but also the events and institutions 
leading up to the creation of it, such as pan-Africanism, the Organization of African Unity and 
the African Union. Additionally, this chapter will discuss the concerns surrounding ECOSOCC 
and the criticism it received.  
2.1 From pan-Africanism to the Organization of African Unity 
The African road towards integration finds it roots in the movement of pan-Africanism. Pan-
Africanism first developed in the Caribbean at the end of the 19th century where slave trade 
and discrimination had created a strong incentive for unity and solidarity amongst members 
of the African diaspora and glorification of Africa as its motherland. Starting of as a 
predominantly racial and cultural movement, pan-Africanism slowly gained a political 
dimension in Africa from the middle of the 1950s. And so it became a political movement 
committed to end colonialism and stimulating socio-economic development. While definitions 
of pan-Africanism can vary, from being denoted as an ideology to a political doctrine, the 
overarching principle of unity amongst the African people, both inside and outside of the 
continent, has been the persistent key element across the definitions (Bedjaoui 2012, 10-1). 
Another very influential event, which strengthened the pan-African movement, was 
decolonization. Large parts of Africa had been colonized by Western European powers in the 
late 19th century. Following the Second World War, US president Roosevelt and British Prime 
Minister Churchill released a declaration stating the war aims of their respective countries. 
This declaration was titled the Atlantic Charter and contained a provision on the autonomy of 
imperial colonies. Even though the document was not an official treaty and therefor never 
ratified, it became one of the most influential documents of its time (Karski 2014, 330). 
Through pressure from both the US and African Colonies, decolonization started. 
Inspired by the pan-African ideology and motivated by the newly acquired self-determination, 
African leaders fought for the liberation of Africa as well as for the unification of the continent. 
Kwame Nkruhma, who became the first president of Ghana after the country claimed its 
independence in 1957, is one of the leaders in defining the foundation of African Unity 
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following the pan-African ideology. African states increasingly started to openly condemn 
imperialism and colonialism and the support for independence movements grew (Bedjaoui 
2012, 12-3). In the 1960s, decolonization moved at a fast pace and most African states were 
winning their independence (Badejo 2008, 16). 
Both pan-Africanism and decolonization can be seen as the catalysts for founding the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963. The kind of organization that the AOU 
was to become was discussed during a pan-African conference held in Liberia in May 1961. 
Therein was decided that a loose form of organization was preferred, wherein cooperation on 
economic, cultural, scientific and technical topics amongst states would be promoted while 
the sovereign integrity of all independent states was kept intact (Elias 1965, 243). The aim of 
the organization was thus to bring African nations together and strengthen independence 
from colonial nations, while at the same time respecting sovereignty (Badejo 2008, 12).  
In its early years, the OAU spent much of its time assisting the liberation of African states from 
colonialism and liberation movements (Murray 2004, 3). The greatest successes of the OAU 
are its role in the decolonization of Africa, as well as its actions against the Apartheid regime 
in Southern Africa and the creation of a common socioeconomic agenda. However, it has been 
severely critiqued for its “dismal record in respect of its other declared objectives” (Maluwa 
2012, 29).  
Global events also pushed African leaders to reconsider the OAU. Especially the end of the 
Cold war reinforced the view that the organization, in its present form, was no longer fit to 
respond to new challenges.  
Other influential events recognized in literature are the rising influence of neo-liberal 
economic ideologies and liberal democratic principles; the increasing demands for the respect 
of human rights and the inclusion of civil society organizations; and the personal rivalries 
among some African political leaders (Makinda & Okumu 2008, 31; Welz 2013, 3). 
Additionally, the 1990s introduced new pan-African theories and proposals which no longer 
were in line with the OAU, such as the Arusha Charter calling for the need of integrated civil 
society. The wish to change the organization to adapt it to the globalizing world, as well as to 
regain a position on the world stage, was born. A compromise on what this organization would 
look like was reached during the extraordinary summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, in September 
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1999. This compromise took the form of the Sirte Declaration, which established the African 
Union (Maluwa 2012, 30-4; Bedjaouni 2012, 19). 
2.2 The African Union 
The African Union Treaty was adopted and immediately signed by 27 African countries in July 
2000 in Lomé, Togo. This treaty discussed the dissolution of the OAU within a year and its 
replacement by the new organization, the African Union and its Constitutive Act (Bedjaouni 
2012, 19-20). While the Constitutive Act of the African Union was already adopted in July 2000 
and the establishment of AU officially declared by the Assembly of the OAU in March 2001, it 
took until May 2001 before the Act entered into force, after two-thirds of the OAU members 
had ratified it. From that moment onwards, the Constitutive Act superseded the OAU. 
However, the OAU was given a year of transitional period before being completely replaced 
by the AU. The inaugural session of the AU took place in July 2002, a day after the OAU’s final 
summit (Maluwa 2012, 31). 
Vision, motives and principle 
The African Union has not only replaced its predecessor in name, but has included great 
changes to its constitution. In its Constitutive Act, consisting of 33 disposable articles, the 
African Union envisions “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own 
citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena” (www.au.int1, retrieved on 
04/06/2015). Among the 14 objectives stipulated by the Constitutive Act of the AU, we can 
find the objectives to 
- “PROMOTE AND DEFEND AFRICAN COMMON POSITIONS ON ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE CONTINENT AND 
ITS PEOPLES;  
- PROMOTE PEACE, SECURITY, AND STABILITY ON THE CONTINENT;  
- PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS, POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND GOOD 
GOVERNANCE; 
- PROMOTE AND PROTECT HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON 
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS AND OTHER RELEVANT HUMAN INSTRUMENTS;  
- ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS WHICH ENABLE THE CONTINENT TO PLAY ITS RIGHTFUL ROLE IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY AND IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS; AND 
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- COORDINATE AND HARMONIZE THE POLICIES BETWEEN THE EXISTING AND FUTURE REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITIES” (AU Constitutive Act, 5-6; see appendix A for a complete list of the 
objectives).  
While the OAU objectives was relatively narrow in scope, the Constitutive Act of the AU 
includes a far more profound emphasis on economic and political integration, but especially a 
new commitment to the advancement of ideals such as peace and security, human rights, rule 
of law, good governance and democracy. The key mission of the organization is to create 
greater unity and cooperation in order to improve living conditions in Africa. For this reason, 
literature speaks of a “complete break with its predecessor organization”  (Badejo 2008, 12; 
Yusuf & Ouguergouz 2012, 1).  
Another surprising changes to the AU in contrast to the OAU, is the incorporation of very 
expended principles which can have far-reaching implications (Maluwa 2012, 44). Amongst 
these are the principles of “participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union”; 
“the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly 
in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity”; “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good 
governance”; and “condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments” 
(AU Constitutive Act, 6-7; see appendix B for a complete list of the principles). 
Structure 
The African Union represents all 54 nations of the African continent, with the exception of 
Morocco. The admission to membership depends solely on the acceptance of the founding 
treaty of the organization. Membership can constitutionally be refused if governments have 
come to power through unconstitutional means such as military coups or corrupt elections. 
The AU can also suspend members whose government is deemed to have changed through 
unconstitutional means (Badejo 2008, 13). 
The Constitutive Act of the AU established 17 key institutions. The supreme institution of the 
AU is the Assembly, comprised of the Heads of State or their accredited representatives. The 
Assembly determines the common policies of the Union and monitors their implementation 
within Member States. The Executive Council is composed of Ministers or other Authorities 
designated by Member States. The Council coordinates and takes decisions on policies of 
12 
 
common interest as articulated by the Assembly, and is thus mainly responsible for the 
implementation of policy decisions made by the Assembly. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) 
was established in accordance with the expressed vision of a people-driven African Union. The 
aim of PAP is to become an institution with full legislative powers, composed of members 
elected by the people of Africa. PAP’s ultimate function is to facilitate the implementation of 
policies and objectives of the African Union. However since it does not have legislative power, 
it cannot yet fulfill this task. The institution responsible for the executive tasks is the 
Commission. Furthermore, the AU consists of several specialized organs and the Court on 
Human and People’s Rights (www.au.int1, retrieved on 04/06/2015). 
Challenges constituted by these institutions are manifold. According to a report by the Center 
for Conflict Resolution, some of these institutions have overlapping mandates, while others 
have competing ones. Furthermore, some institutions, such as the aspiration to create a Court 
of Justice, seem to represent wishes and ideas rather than presently existing needs. Also, some 
institutions, such as PAP which still lacks legitimacy, and ECOSOCC, which seems to have failed 
in its function to mobilize CSOs, are relatively powerless (CCR Report 2013, 23). 
2.3 The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) 
ECOSOCC, together with PAP, was specifically designed to increase the voice of the African 
people in the AU’s decision making procedures, in accordance to the AU objectives stated in 
the Constitutive Act (Kane et al. 2007, 9). The institution is, more specifically, invoked in article 
22 of the AU Constitutive Act (www.au.int2, retrieved on 04/06/2015). Because there is no 
protocol to the article establishing ECOSOCC, the status of the organ is based on the statutes 
which have been adopted by the Assembly, meaning that amending the statutes of ECOSOCC 
is relatively easy (Kane et al. 2007, 33). 
Within the OAU, the task to facilitate civil society contribution rested upon the Conference for 
Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), established at the OAU 
summit in Lomé in 2000 and reinforced by a Memorandum of Understanding which was 
adopted two years later at the Durban summit. The CSSDCA was transferred into the AU and 
tasked with the establishment of ECOSOCC. Under its auspices, the first civil society 
conference took place in June 2001. At the second conference, organized in 2002, the 
proposed statutes of ECOSOCC were reviewed. The statutes had been prepared by a working 
group nominated by the, at the time interim, chairperson of the AU. Review of the prepared 
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statutes happened by another working group comprised of both AU and Civil Society 
Organization (CSO) members. The revised draft of ECOSOCC was subsequently presented to 
the fourth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of Ministers in Maputo in July 2003 which 
proposed further amendments. The statutes were finally accepted by the Assembly of Heads 
of States and Government in Addis Ababa in July 2004 (Kane et al. 2007, 33). In late 2005, the 
CSSDCA was given a new name, after which it has been referred to as the African Citizen’s 
Directorate (CIDO). 
Structure 
ECOSOCC is a purely advisory organ of the AU. It can give recommendations on existing 
policies and programs, as well as propose programs fitting to the principles of the AU. In a 
more abstract manner, the AU states ECOSOCC’s function as the connecting organ between 
CSOs and the organization, and through that a contributor to the promotion of human rights, 
gender equality, child rights, rule of law, good governance and democratic principles 
(www.au.int3, retrieved on 05/06/2015). 
In accordance to article 22 of the Constitutive Act (Appendix C), ECOSOCC is composed of 
different social and professional groups of the AU Member States (www.au.int4, retrieved on 
06/06/2015). These include, but are not limited to, social groups, professional groups, NGOs, 
CBOs and Cultural Organizations. The composition also includes CSOs from the African 
diaspora (ECOSOCC statutes, 4). 
ECOSOCC includes a General Assembly, a Standing Committee, Sectoral Clusters Committees 
and a Credentials Committee. The General Assembly is the highest body of ECOSOCC and is 
composed of 150 CSOs: two from each Member State, ten regional, eight continental, twenty 
from the African diaspora and six in ex-officio capacity. Furthermore, the General assembly 
must meet the requirement of a 50% gender equality as well as be composed by a minimum 
of 50% youth representatives between the age of 18 to 35 years (ECOSOCC statutes, 5). The 
General Assembly meets once every two years and is responsible for electing the members of 
the Standing Committee, prepare and submit advisory opinions and reports; make proposition 
on the budget and activities of ECOSOCC; review and adapt the code of ethics an conduct for 
CSOs working with or affiliated to the AU and review ECOSOCC’s activities. Also, the General 
Assembly elects the five members of the Bureau and its Presiding Officer (ECOSOCC statutes, 
8-9).  
14 
 
The Standing Committee is the executive branch of ECOSOCC and is responsible for the 
coordination of ECOSOCC’s work. Furthermore, the Standing Committee is responsible for 
preparing the General Assembly meetings as well as preparing and submitting annual reports 
to the Assembly of the AU. The Standing committee, in consultation with the Commission, is 
also responsible for determining the conditions for observer status admission to ECOSOCC. 
The Standing Committee is composed of 18 members: the six members of the Bureau, the 
chairpersons of ten Sectoral Cluster Committees and two representatives of the Commission 
(ECOSOCC Statutes, 9). 
The Sectoral Clusters Committees function as the operational mechanisms of ECOSOCC and 
aims at formulating opinions and providing advice and inputs on ten specific topics of the AU. 
These topics are: peace and security; political affairs; infrastructure and energy; social affairs 
and health; human resources, science and technology; trade and industry; rural economy and 
agriculture; economic affairs; women and gender and cross-cutting programs. The Sectoral 
Clusters Committees prepare and submit reports to ECOSOCC on their specific subjects 
(ECOSOCC statutes, 10-11).  
The Credentials Committee is responsible for inspecting the credentials of ECOSOCC members 
and their representatives. This committee is composed of five regional representatives, one 
representative of the diaspora, one representative of special interest groups and two 
representatives of the Commission (ECOSOCC statutes, 11).  
The secretariat activities of ECOSOCC are assumed by CIDO, which has the additional 
responsibility of being the liaison between the AU and civil society on the African continent 
and the African diaspora (Kane et al. 2007, 30). 
Membership 
The ECOSOCC statutes state ten different requirements to be fulfilled by CSOs in order to 
become eligible for ECOSOCC. Amongst these requirements, are the requirements that CSOs 
need to have similar objectives and principles to those of the AU; the requirement that at least 
50 percent of the resources of the CSO is derived from membership to the CSO; and the 
requirement that CSOs need to be registered in a Member State of the Union or either meet 
the General conditions of eligibility for the granting of Observer Status or be a proven or 
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registered diaspora CSO for at least three years (ECOSOCC statutes, 6-7; see appendix D for 
the complete list of eligibility requirements).  
The funding criteria, which states that at least 50% of the CSO funding must originate from 
within Africa, excludes over 80 percent of the NGOs that have been working on the AU. This 
caused a lot of criticism from the civil society (Kane et al. 2007, 54). The effectiveness of the 
institution is further restricted by the requirement that CSOs must be registered in one of the 
AU Member States. Because African CSOs are often not well organized, this is likely to be 
responsible for the exclusion of another great number of CSOs. Finally, the requirement of 
CSOs having ‘similar objectives’ as the African Union might mean the exclusion of critical CSOs, 
while at the same time coercing CSOs in ECOSOCC to think like the AU. As Moyo points out, 
this leads to an ineffective and uncritical ECOSOCC wherein civil society is not realistically 
represented (Moyo 2008, 275-8).  
Election troubles 
The very first meeting of ECOSOCC took place in Nairobi, Kenya, in June 2005. As not all the 
national and regional structures of ECOSOCC had yet been fully constructed, the first mandate 
for the interim ECOSOCC extended for a period of two years, from March 2005 to March 2007 
(Akokpari et al. 2008, 298-300). 
During the 21st Ordinary Session of the Council, a decision was adopted directing the 
Commission to make arrangements for the election of the ECOSOCC General Assembly and 
the ECOSOCC Statutes. Subsequently, the Commission developed an election framework 
based on four components: a call for application; the process of receiving and sorting out the 
applications; procedure for verification and appraisal of eligibility and election management.  
The actual election was expected to take place in the second half of 2012. However, the 
application deadline was extended twice because of unsuccessful appraisal processes, which 
produced very little eligible candidates. In total, 219 candidates were reviewed, but only 52 of 
those applications were able to meet the eligibility requirements specified in ECOSOCC 
statutes. As a consequence, it was decided to postpone the elections, allowing applications 
until 30 June 2014 (Executive Council 2014, 2-3; www.au.int5, retrieved on 05/06/2015). The 
Second General Assembly was elected shortly after, but 15 March 2015, ECOSOCC issued a 
statement calling for candidates to apply for by-elections into the General Assembly in order 
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to increase the body’s representativeness. The application, according to the statement, will 
be accepted until 31 December 2015 (www.au.int7, retrieved on 07/06/2015). 
The elections finally took place in December 2014. The composition of ECOSOCC includes CSOs 
from 33 out of the 54 Member States of the AU, with only few Member States providing two 
representatives, accounting for a total of 50 CSOs originating from Members States. 
Additionally, six regional representatives were elected and 8 continental representatives. This 
summed up to a General Assembly of only 64 members from the envisaged 150 (www.au.int6, 
retrieved on 05/06/2015). Until now, ECOSOCC has been primarily focused on shaping its own 
structure, and has not yet been able to fulfill its function as an advisory organ to the AU. 
Further concerns 
ECOSOCC has encountered several problems since its official establishment in 2005. According 
to Kane et al. (2007), there is a great variety in the knowledge and development of the 
ECOSOCC model across the Member States. In this regard, Kenya seems to be the most 
advanced, while other Member States seem to have no ECOSOCC presence of any kind. In yet 
other Member States, national chapters of ECOSOCC have been established but show a low 
level of CSO participation and representativeness (2007, 35). Also, little publicity about the 
organ, functions and elections result in a relatively small amount of participation (Kane et al. 
2007, 54). Furthermore, the process of election of representatives of both national chapters 
and continental chapters, are unclear and flawed (Kane et al. 2007, 6). 
Another concern voiced at the Addis Ababa meeting in 2007 was the role played by CIDO, 
which acts as a secretariat to ECOSOCC as well as being the focal point for CSOs within the AU 
(Kane et al. 2007, 54). Because ECOSOCC remains extremely reliant on CIDO for funding, 
advice and administrative support, the effectiveness and representativeness of the 
directorate influences the capabilities of ECOSOCC (Kane et al. 2007, 6). For example, the 
selection criteria employed by CIDO in selecting participants to fora and interim structures of 
ECOSOCC have been unclear (Akokpari et al. 2008, 298; Kane et al. 2007, 31-5).  
Finally, ECOSOCC’s legal framework severely limits its position and effectiveness by limiting its 
capabilities to a mere advisory function. Because of these concerns, it is voiced that ECOSOCC 
cannot be seen as a credible voice of independent CSOs and is therefore not able to play its 
intended role within the AU (Kane et al. 2007, 6-7). This is further endorsed by reports stating 
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that the quality and substance of debates in ECOSOCC have been very poor, raising the 
concern that fora were used more in order to endorse passed decisions than to influence 
future ones (Kane et al. 2007, 31). 
A more general problem of the AU also affects the functioning of ECOSOCC. Problems with 
Member States’ lack of commitment lead to dysfunctional participation in the institutions of 
the AU undermining the legitimacy of these institutions (Welz 2013, 5). Furthermore, a great 
lack of both financial and human resources severely restricts the capabilities of all the AU’s 
institutions. To illustrate the situation, the AU Commission employed 669 people in 2012, 
compared to the 33.000 employees of the European Union. While many Member States still 
do not pay their membership fees, around 55 percent of the AU’s core budget in 2013 was 
provided by external actors (CCR report 2012, 13-4 & 30; Welz 2013, 5). As Kingah and 
Langenhove rightly state, “regional organizations which lack resources cannot be expected to 
perform optimally”, hence the lack of resources creates a serious problem for inter alia 
ECOSOCC (2012, 212). 
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3. Theoretical framework 
In order to understand upon which ideals the decisions leading up to the establishment of 
ECOSOCC within the AU were based, we turn to International Relations (IR) theories. IR 
theories provide different views which attempt to explain world politics and globalization 
according to a variety of assumptions. Of these theories, realism has been the most influential 
theory used to explain foreign policy and intra-state relations. Over the years, realism 
developed many different strains within its own theory, such as neorealism, defensive 
structural realism and neoclassical realism, as a reaction to critique uttered against classical 
realism from other IR theories. At the present, neorealism is the most dominant strain of 
realism within mainstream North American IR studies (Baylis et al. 2011, 83).. 
Next to the development of theories in the field of IR, other fields of research such as sociology 
and organization theory became of increasing interest to political scientists (Hall & Taylor 
1996, 946). While there is a large variety of IR theories applied to make sense of world politics, 
the extend of this paper does not allow for a deliberation of each of the existing theories. 
Hence, a restricted selection must be made of theories to be tested.  
Seeing that neorealism at the present is the prominent theory in IR, this theory claims enough 
relevance to be discussed in this paper. Furthermore, two other theories with a special focus 
on how organizations develop shall be the topic of this research: social constructivism and 
sociological institutionalism. These three theories offer a wide range of assumptions which 
can, in their turn, be translated into different hypothesis to be tested against the casus at 
hand.  
This chapter shall offer an overview of the theories and outlay their underlying assumptions.  
3.1 Neorealism 
The development of realism as we know today happened in the late 1930s and early 1940s 
with the works of Carr and Morgenthau. Their theories contrasted sharply against the interwar 
period idealistic theory of international relations. The idealistic theory claimed that there was 
harmony of interests among states and that international conflict could be resolved through 
international law and democratization (Griffiths et al. 2014, 292). In contrast, realism 
presented assumptions which gave a much more grim perspective for international relations. 
Morgenthau, one of the first scholars employing the term ‘realism’, offered three core 
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assumptions: (1) the most important actors are nation-states or their decision makers because 
of the anarchic structure of the global system; (2) international policy does not reflect 
domestic politics as states are motivated by their survival instinct and (3) the struggle for 
power is what defines international relations (Vasquez 1998, 37; Griffiths et al. 2014, 292). 
Furthermore, Morgenthau places much importance on the influence of the flawed human 
nature and failures of individuals as defining elements in state behavior (Elmar & Jensen 2014, 
3). 
The realism theory has dominated the field of IR since 1939, when the start of World War Two 
made it quite apparent that the ideologist theory failed to explain the events (Dunne & 
Schmidt 2011, 86). However, regardless of its huge success, realism was also subject to much 
criticism. One of the critique was that realism failed to explain sufficiently the increase of 
interdependence amongst states. Also, the assumption of the flawed human nature could not 
properly account for periods of peace and cooperation which periodically happened. This is 
when neorealism made its entrance into IR (Griffiths et al. 2014, 293). 
Neorealism argues, in contrast to classical realism, that international politics are defined by 
the structure of the global system, and dismisses the assumption that human nature and its 
flaws is responsible for states’ foreign policy decision (Waltz 1979, 77-99; Lamy 2011, 116). 
The theory of neorealism aims at explaining foreign policy at three different levels. Firstly, it 
provides an understanding of foreign policy actions specifically. Secondly, the theory provides 
an explanation for overarching themes in foreign policy and thirdly, it offers an explanation 
for the general relationships in international affairs (Palmer & Morgan 2006, 14-5). Waltz, as 
one of the founders of neorealism, claims that the most important and defining concept in 
international relations is structure. According to Waltz, structure, and not its units, is 
responsible for shaping the way international relations works. If a structure is appropriately 
defined, its effects could be transferable to another similar structure (Waltz 1986, 330). 
Therefore, it is not human nature which influences the way states approach their foreign 
policy, but necessity. Waltz explains political structure according to three characteristics: its 
ordering, the similarity of the units and the distribution of capabilities (Waltz 1979, 77-101).  
More thoroughly explained, this means that states function in an anarchic world where there 
is no higher power to rule or protect them. Because of this fact, states, who are mostly 
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concerned with their own survival, compete with each other in terms of the amount of power 
they have. States’ main goal is survival, which they try to attain by balancing their own power 
to that of others. According to neorealism, the material capabilities controlled by a state are 
the basis of its power, which encompasses not only military power, but also socio-economic 
power needed for the growth of military power,  such as wealth, population size and political 
power (Mearsheimer 2007, 83). 
Another important element of neorealism is the belief that the internal structure of states 
does not influence its behavior, as the state behaves according to its position in the hierarchic 
order of the system. For this reason, it does not matter what the internal structure of a state 
is, e.g. whether it is democratic or not, as all states who find themselves in a similar position 
in the hierarchy will function in a similar manner. Differing paths in policy decision are a result 
of Waltz’ third characteristic: the amount of accumulated capabilities (Lamy 2011, 119).  
In summary, this produces five assumptions: 
1. States are the main actors in international relations and they operate in an anarchic 
system; 
2. All states possess some capabilities and can therefore inflict harm on others; 
3. States can never be certain of the intentions of others; 
4. A states’ main goal is survival; 
5. States make rational decisions in order to maximize their gains (Mearsheimer 2007, 
73-4). 
Putting these assumptions together creates a system wherein states need to compete with 
other states they do not trust in order to survive. This competition means shifting the balance 
of power in their favor by acquiring more capabilities. This creates the security dilemma, which 
entails that the increase of a state’s security means a decrease in another state’s security. 
Therefore, every shift in the balance of power generates an incentive for another shift 
(Mearsheimer 2007, 75). 
With regard to the development of intergovernmental cooperation, neorealism at first seems 
to present a problem: why would states which do not trust each other and compete with each 
other cooperate and form intergovernmental organizations? (Caporaso 1992, 605). This 
question is answered by the claim that states, concerned with relative gains, will enter into 
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cooperation if they believe they can increase their relative gain through such a cooperation 
(Shimko 1992, 298; Snidal 1985, 593-5). The incentive for cooperation is thus self-help. 
According to neorealists, the internal hierarchy in cooperative initiatives are a reflection of the 
hierarchy in the global system. Furthermore, they believe that institutions do not affect the 
realm of international politics (Mearsheimer 1994, 7). 
Derived from this vision on institutions, the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) was developed 
as the counterpart of Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), which states that democratic states do 
not engage in intergovernmental conflicts with each other. According to HST, states can 
occasionally operate through institutions, but it is the most powerful actors in the system who 
shapes the institution in accordance to its own preferences. Cooperation is achieved through 
reward and/or coercion by the hegemon within the institution, which enables the most 
powerful actors to influence other actors within their sphere of influence. (Bayar & Kotelis 
2014, 243). The ultimate goal of the cooperation, according to HST, is the creation of stability 
resolving around the preferences of the hegemon (Clark 2011, 15-7). 
Based on the neorealist theory, international cooperation is motivated by self-interest states 
aiming at maximizing their gains, which can be of a military and/or socio-economic nature, in 
order to survive.  This means that the establishment of ECOSOCC should, if it were in line with 
neorealism, provide a material incentive for the Member States who were mostly responsible 
for its establishment. Following this logic, one would thus expect that the most influential 
actor(s) at the establishment and shaping of the African Union recognized a possible benefit 
in the creation of ECOSOCC. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: If neorealism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of 
ECOSOCC, the creation of the organ follows an assessment of opportunity-increase of 
the political influence for the main actors responsible for shaping the AU. 
According to the Hegemonic Stability Theory, an international organization is shaped in 
accordance to the preferences of the most powerful actor(s) within the organization. Through 
this actor’s influence, stability is created amongst members. Following this theory, we would 
expect the structure and activities of ECOSOCC to reflect those of the most powerful actors 
within the African Union.  The hypothesis derived from this theory would therefore be: 
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H2: If neorealism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of 
ECOSOCC, the ECOSOCC model should support the preferences of the most powerful 
actor(s) within the African Union. 
3.2 Social Constructivism 
In contrary to neorealism, social constructivism – also called constructivism – is a relatively 
young theory in IR. Regardless, in under three decades, the theory managed to climb the 
ladder of influence and become one of the leading theories in the field. Constructivism as a 
theory arose from the challenges presented by neorealism and neoliberalism. As opposed to 
the focus on structure offered by these theories, constructivism is more interested in the 
process of how interaction and learning can change both behavior and identities. With this, 
constructivism has reframed the study of international relations to explain how identities and 
interests are formed (Wendt 1992, 291-2). The ideas of individualism and materialism have 
been contested by constructivists since the end of the 1980s, and its rise was especially 
enabled by the end of the Cold War and the resulting changes in the global system (Barnett 
2011, 56-7). 
The concepts of idealism and holism represent the core ideas of the theory. Idealism refers to 
the social constructability of ideas through knowledge, experience and interpretation. For 
example, the concepts of power politics and self-help are institutions that do not exist as such, 
but are ideas debated and given shape by states, as is for example the concept of anarchy. 
Holism refers to the concept that because of social constructability, the world does not have 
a fixed structure or unchangeable states, as these are dependent on their underlying norms 
(Wendt 1992, 394; Barnett 2011, 158).  
A third important concept in constructivism is interaction and the relationship between agents 
and structures. Through the exchange of norms and practices, actors are able to grow an 
understanding of others and develop a relationship. Constitutive norms are responsible for 
creating the image by which actors judge others. In constructivism, it is very important to 
understand that actor’s identities are what define their preferences, and their preferences are 
responsible for shaping their behavior in accordance to other actors (Hopf 1998, 173-5). 
The understanding of power in constructivism is also very different from the realist 
understanding of the concept, even though it is a central theoretical element in both schools 
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of thought. According to constructivism, power is not only material but also discursive, which 
means it includes knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology and language. Discursive power enables 
actors to understand their world, and produces order through predictability which in turn 
enables trust amongst states (Hopf 1998, 177-9).  
In his article “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, Wendt offers a 
summary of constructivism’s three core claims: 
1. STATES ARE THE UNITS OF ANALYSIS; 
2. KEY STRUCTURES IN THE STATE SYSTEMS ARE HOLISTIC AND SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED RATHER THAN 
MATERIAL; 
3. STATE IDENTITIES SHAPE STATE INTERESTS AND ARE TO A SIGNIFICANT EXTEND CONSTRUCTED BY SOCIAL 
STRUCTURES (Wendt 1994, 385). 
Cooperation, according to constructivism, can be accounted for through the distribution of 
identities in interests of relevant states (Hopf 1998, 189). Futhermore, international 
cooperation enables Member States to take on new identities and interests according to the 
International Socialization Theory (IST) of social constructivism. According to IST, institutions 
have the greatest effect not on the external level, but rather on the internal level through the 
shaping of state interests and behavior (Bearce & Bondella 2007, 703-4). Socialization is 
defined by Checkel as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given 
community” (2005, 804). The process of socialization implies that actors switch from 
reasoning from a logic of consequences to reasoning through a logic of appropriateness.  A 
distinction can also be made between two types of adherence to the logic of appropriateness: 
type I and type II socialization. Type I refers to a superficial socialization where the actor 
changes its behavior in order to fit socially expected norms, without truly agreeing with or 
liking the behavior in itself. Type II refers to a profound socialization, where actors accept the 
new norm as the true and acceptable norm. While in type I socialization, the actors only copy 
the norms, type II socialization shows a change in the actual identity of the actor (Checkel 
2005, 804). The proposition of profound, or type II, socialization, represents the key 
components of constructivism where interests are shaped through identity.  
According to constructivist theory, international cooperation is based on the presence of 
shared identities amongst actors, enabling cooperation. Following this assumption, one would 
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expect that the establishment of ECOSOCC within the African Union would reflect the 
identities of the Union’s Member States. Following the logic of appropriateness, as the 
identities of actors and their beliefs of right and wrong are responsible for shaping their 
interests, one would expect the norm of a positive attitude towards civil society to be pre-
existing in the African states who shaped ECOSOCC.  This leads to the first hypothesis 
supporting constructivism: 
H3: If social constructivism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment 
of ECOSOCC, the norm of an active and included civil society is a reflection of the same 
norm pre-existing in the Member States of the African Union. 
Besides looking at the motivations behind the establishment of ECOSOCC in its present shape, 
the constructivist theory can also be tested by looking at the subsequent effect of the 
organization on the norm representing a positive attitude towards civil society. According to 
constructivism, cooperation through institutions can shape interests of states over time to 
make these more similar to the norms represented by the organization. In this light, it would 
be expected that the norm representing a positive attitude towards civil society experiences 
a growth in the Member States that did not fully adhere to that norm prior to the 
establishment of ECOSOCC. This leads to a second hypothesis to test the constructivist 
perspective: 
H4: If social constructivism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment 
of ECOSOCC, the organ has enabled a normative change in the practice of Member 
States in regards to civil society.  
3.3 Sociological Institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism is known under a variety of labels: world polity theory, world 
society theory or more simply institutional theory. The theory attempts to explain the shapes 
of structures, identities and behavior of individuals, and nation-states and organization 
through the influence of global institutions and culture. This theory developed, in the same 
manner as social constructivism, as a reaction to theories recognizing actor- and power 
centered elements as the driving forces behind state behavior found for example in 
neorealism. John W. Meyer is recognized as one of the primal developers of the theory, which 
evolved in the 1970s and 1980s. (Meyer 2010, 2-3; Schofer et al. 2012, 57-8).  
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As Meyer puts it, “actors are constructed entities, playing parts as in the theaters. So in realist 
models, the relation of actor and action is causal, with society and its structure as a product. 
In phenomenological models, the actor on the social stage is a scripted identity and enacts 
scripted action” (2010, 4). This position, therefore, does not deny the existence of states as 
actors, but rather shifts the focus of study towards the institutions responsible for influencing 
them (Schofer et al. 2012, 58). 
According to institutionalism, conventional ideas can be seen as cultural models, also called 
‘myths’, which set an example for what nation-states should look like. The global diffusion of 
ideas and policy models, as explained by Strang and Meyer (1993), is one of the consequences 
of cultural models (p. 491). Often, cultural models are copied despite the large differences 
between the context of the original and copying country (Schofer et al. 2012, 58-9).  
Institutionalism views global cultural models as products of history, in contrary to being a 
product of the evolution of values. However, this does not mean that cultural models are 
ideologies brought forth by hegemonic powers by force. Rather, it is an autonomously driven 
evolvement of agreed-upon principles (Schofer et al. 2012, 59). 
While neorealism and constructivism view states and/or organizations as unitary and coherent 
actors, sociological institutionalism views them rather as loose and incoherent structures. 
Because of a lack of clear identity, states make decisions which might not be coherent or 
logical, but which are inspired by the institutional environment. This often results in policies 
being incoherent and also often not reflected in policy implementation. This phenomenon is 
also called ‘decoupling’ (Meyer & Rowan 1977, 357; Meyer 2010, 13; Schofer et al. 2012, 60-
1). As an example, Cole presents the case of human rights were many states, including states 
known for their repressive regimes, have ratified human rights treaties, but showing no actual 
improvement in the de facto human rights situation (Cole 2005, 477). In short, decoupling is 
the gap between what states claim they will do on paper, or via rhetoric, and what they are 
actually doing in reality. 
Decoupling can happen for several reasons. Firstly, organizations may want to hide technical 
anomalies by masking them with the assumption that the structures are working. Secondly, 
an organization can avoid internal conflict and disputes because integration is avoided. 
Thirdly, an organization can find more support from external constituents because the claim 
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of adhering to a policy can grant legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan 1977, 357). However, decoupling 
does not necessarily mean that change is entirely absent, as institutional forces can over time 
affect change even if the organization is loosely coupled. Another important finding is that 
loose coupling seems to be especially ubiquitous in developing countries, as Drori et al. (2003) 
show in their paper on the decoupling of science policies in developing countries which rarely 
result in an actual increase of the scientific labor force (Schofer et al. 2012, 61). 
Although Sociological institutionalism and constructivism look similar in many ways, the 
assumptions of both theories are quite different. Firstly, the state is no longer the unit of 
analysis within institutionalism as it is in constructivism. Instead, the focus is redirected 
towards institutions and how these shape state behavior. Secondly, while constructivism 
emphasizes the logic of appropriateness, stating that states aim to ‘do the right thing’, 
institutionalism argues that states rather follow a logic of confidence and good faith wherein 
the appearance of norm conformity is what grants legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan 1977, 357-8). 
Finally, while in constructivism changes are induced from the inside-out, institutionalism 
rather sees an outside-in influence, where not the existing norms within states influence 
behavior, but the existence of preferred global models. Together with this assumption goes 
that not military or economic power, but rather authority is of influence in cultural 
expectancies (Schofer et al. 2012, 62). 
By examining core assumptions of sociological institutionalism, it can be predicted that the 
establishment of ECOSOCC is largely the result of the logic of confidence and good faith, where 
the establishing Member States attempted to follow a cultural or global model, or ‘blueprint’, 
of how an international organization is expected to function. Thus, the motives for creating 
ECOCOCC would be to conform to a global model wherein civil society engagement is deemed 
as necessary. In this light, ECOSOCC would be a copy of a pre-existing model. Following this 
logic, the first hypothesis in support of sociological institutionalism that shall be tested is as 
follows: 
H5: If sociological institutionalism is the correct approach to understanding the 
establishment of ECOSOCC, the organ has been created in accordance to a global 
cultural model favoring a positive attitude towards civil society, while not necessarily 
reflecting the attitudes of the Member States. 
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Furthermore, the assumption of decoupling can help predict the expected further behavior of 
ECOSOCC according to sociological institutionalism. Namely, the theory of decoupling predicts 
that while ECOSOCC on paper fulfills the requirements expected according to cultural models, 
the loose structure within the organization causes a gap between rhetoric and 
implementation. Therefore, while ECOSOCC presents a positive motivation of attitude 
towards civil society inclusion and its role in ECOSOCC in a rhetorical sense, the 
implementation of the model does not show a similar attitude. This leads to the second 
hypothesis for testing the sociological institutionalis perspective: 
H6: If sociological institutionalism is the correct approach to understanding the 
establishment of ECOSOCC, the rhetorical setup of the organ does not correspond to 
the subsequent practice of the policies included therein. 
3.4 Levels of analysis and observation 
The different theories presented in this chapter and the subsequent hypothesis offer different 
perspectives on how international organizations are shaped. By both looking at the shaping 
process of ECOSOCC and its subsequent activities should provide the information required for 
testing the six hypothesis developed in this chapter. 
It is important however to also realize that the levels of analysis as well as the levels of 
observation differ for the three theories which will be tested. The neoliberalist school of 
thought focusses on the macro- or systemic level, as its focus lies with how the anarchic 
structure of the global system shapes state behaviour and interaction. Furthermore, the 
theory follows as state-centric approach. Hence, the level of observation for neorealism is the 
state. 
In contrast, the level of analysis for social constructivism includes both the macro- or systemic 
and the meso- or domestic levels of analysis. According to the theory, structures in 
organizations matter to defining how states interact but are shaped at the domestic level. 
Since social constructivism follows the same state-centric assumptions as realism, the unit of 
observation for this theory is also the state – its behaviour and its identity. 
Finally, the sociological institutionalism school of thought focusses solely on the macro-level, 
and assumes that state behaviour is entirely defined by cultural models at the institutional 
level. Because social institutionalism has its roots deeply in sociology, the macro-level here is 
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less related to the structure of the system, as is referred to in constructivism and neorealism, 
but rather to large-scale patterns and trends, such as institutions. As opposed to the two 
preceding theories, the level of observation in sociological institutionalism is not the state but 
the institution. 
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4. Methodology 
This chapter will discuss the methods of research employed in this thesis. After elaborating on 
the research design, the key variables for each theory shall be discussed and operationalized. 
Finally, the case selection will be discussed. 
4.1 Research design 
This research employs a qualitative research design using a single case study and in-depth 
analysis. The paper employs a theoretical lens to look at the Economic, Social and Cultural 
Council of the African Union, and employs the method of process tracing to test hypotheses 
deduced from the theories of neorealism, social constructivism and sociological 
institutionalism. The process-tracing method attempts to identify causal processes between 
dependent and independent variables, by identifying processes leading to the occurrence, or 
absence, of variables (George & Bennett 2004, 206). To this aim, a variety of sources will be 
used including amongst other things scholarly literature, media sources, reports and survey 
data. Both content, discourse will be analyzed. 
4.2 Operationalization 
In order to enable the testing of the hypotheses presented in chapter 3, it is important to first 
determine and operationalize the independent variables for each theoretical framework. To 
this end, a list of indicators must be identified and a means of measurement for each indicator 
needs to be created. 
Realism 
According to neorealism, the behavior of a state is ultimately defined by its power. Power, 
therefore, is this theory’s dependent variable. The amount of power a state has, is further 
defined by its capabilities, both material and social-economical. For the purpose of this 
research, the analysis uses the indicator of political capabilities to measure the change in the 
dependent variable. Political capabilities can be defined as the political influence of a state, 
which refers to the ability of a state to influence others. Defined as such, the theory indicates 
that in order to be willing to create an institution such as ECOSOCC, the institution must create 
an opportunity to increase the political influence of the state(s) enabling its creation. 
In the first hypothesis, the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is 
tested by analyzing whether ECOSOCC created power-increasing opportunity for within the 
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organizational structure. To test the hypotheses, it must thus be explored whether such 
opportunities are created by ECOSOCC. 
The hegemonic stability theory implies that political influence can also be measured by the 
way hegemonic powers impose their personal interests upon actors within their sphere of 
influence using cooperative institutions. The independent variable for the second hypothesis 
is therefore imposition of interests translated into policies. In order to test the second 
hypothesis of neorealism, it must be established whether any similarities exist between in 
policies regarding civil society of the hegemonic power(s) and those of ECOSOCC.  
Social constructivism 
The main independent variable of the constructivist perspective that shall be used in this 
paper appropriateness. According to the theory, appropriateness defines how states behave. 
Appropriateness is not just expressed in an actor’s view, but should also be recognizable in its 
behavior since a norm implies that the actor employing it beliefs it is a ‘good thing to do’.  
What is deemed appropriate or inappropriate is in turn, influenced by the existing norms. 
Defined as such, the theory indicates that in order to be willing to create an institution such 
as ECOSOCC, norm for institutionalized civil society needs to exist amongst the actors 
responsible for its creation.  
In the first hypothesis, the relationship between appropriateness and norm is analyzed by 
measuring the presence or absence of the civil society normative framework amongst the AU 
member states prior to and during the establishment of ECOSOCC. 
Secondly, the logic of appropriateness explains that norms which are prominent in 
cooperative initiatives, should lead to a strengthening of these norms amongst the members 
of that initiative. Therefore, because ECOSOCC supports the norm of civil society engagement, 
this should result in an increased engagement of civil society in Member States, e.g. a change 
in what is deemed appropriate behavior. The relationship of these variables is that if the 
independent variable is present, the norm implementation should increase at a state level.  
Sociological institutionalism 
Finally, the independent variable for the sociological institutionalism framework which is 
derived from its assumptions and will be used for this paper is the logic of confidence and 
good faith. According to this logic, states follow existing global models and replicate them onto 
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their own institutions, without actually adopting the content of the models. The logic of 
confidence and good faith can be operationalized through two indicators. The first indicator 
is the existence, or non-existence, of an accepted global model. In causal terms, this means 
that a global model concerning the engagement of civil society should exist in order for 
ECOSOCC to find its place in the African Union. Such a culture must be compared against the 
national culture in order to verify whether the system follows an accepted and 
institutionalized norm or a global cultural norm which they do not necessarily agree with but 
implement in order to gain ‘good faith’.  
A second indicator is deduced from the decoupling theory of institutionalism. In order to keep 
good faith, states copy existing models but because those are in discourse with their individual 
context, the models are not implemented, creating a gap between rhetoric and 
implementation. This means that even though the content might show a certain preference, 
disjunction of subsequent action will occur. Hence, if the logic of confidence and good faith 
can be operationalized in this context by looking at the indicator of disconnection between 
written and implemented action.  
4.3 Case selection 
There are several reasons why the existence of ECOSOCC has been selected as the case study 
in this research. The establishment of ECOSOCC first received a lot of praise, but much criticism 
followed. While an integrated organ for civil society might appears very promising, many 
critics have pointed towards its ineffectiveness. Many skeptics also pointed to the unlikeliness 
of a union including many states denoted as non-democratic to truly involve civil society. The 
peculiarity of the situation, together with the criticism on ECOSOCC, together with the youth 
of ECOSOCC, and the connected relatively small amount of research done on the topic, forms 
a sufficient basis to raise the interest upon the question of why the organ was created, which 
this paper attempts to answer. 
Furthermore, since one of the apparent results of globalization is the increase of 
intergovernmental organizations, testing diverging theories on their motivations might shed 
light unto greater questions, such as their actual influence  in the global society. To this end, 
researching the root motivations behind the establishment of ECOSOCC can add to existing 
literature on the subject. 
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5. ECOSOCC in theoretical perspective 
This chapter will draw on the research methods and apply the indicators as discussed in 
chapter 2 to the establishment and development of ECOSOCC in the African Union. Based on 
the presence or absence of these indicators, evidence is provided to test the six hypothesis 
presented in the theoretical framework of this paper. The theories will be tested in the same 
order as presented in chapter 3, starting will neorealism and continuing with social 
constructivism. Finally, the theory of sociological institutionalism will be verified. The 
discussion on which theoretical framework can best be applied on the case of ECOSOCC will 
subsequently be proposed in chapter 6. 
5.1 The neorealist perspective 
The two hypothesis that have been constructed using the assumptions proposed by 
neorealism are as follows:  
H1: If neorealism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of 
ECOSOCC, the creation of the organ follows an assessment of opportunity-increase of 
the political influence for the main actors responsible for shaping the AU. 
H2: If neorealism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of 
ECOSOCC, the ECOSOCC model should support the preferences of the most powerful 
actor(s) within the African Union. 
According to the neorealist theory, the global system is shaped by anarchy and states are 
driven by motives of self-interest as a result of their instinct to survive within that system. This 
survival instinct is expressed through the power-seeking behavior of these states. In the 
theoretical framework, power was defined as a state’s capabilities, measured in terms of 
military, economic and political power. To the end of this research, the focus will be solely on 
the latest element: political power. Political power is defined as the ability of a state to 
influence the behavior of others. The proposition outlaid in the first hypothesis is that the 
establishment of ECOSOCC was motivated by the incentive of states to increase their political 
influence. To verify the first hypothesis I will therefore attempt to establish whether any such 
beneficial incentives existed. 
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To test the second hypothesis, we follow the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) and its 
assumption that powerful states use cooperative initiatives in order to influence the behavior 
of others within their sphere of influence. In order to test the hypotheses, I will look at the 
similarities between the interests of the most powerful Member State(s) of the AU and the 
way the institution has been shaped. 
H1 
ECOSOCC was invoked in the AU Constitutive Act of 2000 (Bedjaouni 2012, 19-20). The 
wording of Article 22.1 defines that the institution was to have advisory power only, thereby 
restricting in a great manner the amount political influence which could be gained from the 
institution. Influence-increasing incentives, therefore, must not be sought in ECOSOCC’s 
establishment but rather in the way the institution was shaped. This lengthy process took 
place between 2000 and 2004 and ended when the Statutes of ECOSOCC were adopted by the 
Assembly (Kane et al. 2007, 33). 
The statutes were prepared by a working group appointed by the Interim President of the AU, 
and reviewed by State representatives rather than CSOs. When the final statutes were 
adopted, they included some very peculiar clauses severely restricting eligibility of CSOs to 
ECOSOCC. For example, CSOs were required to be registered in one of the AU Member States, 
which, regarding the great lack of formalization in Civil Society in some of the Member States 
excluded many right away. Additionally, a requirement for funding, which stated that at least 
50 percent of a CSOs resources must originate from its own members locked out many CSOs 
which only existed thanks to foreign funding. During the election procedure of the Second 
General Assembly of ECOSOCC, these restrictions became very apparent: only 52 of the 219 
reviewed applications passed the requirements (Executive Council 2014, 2-3). 
Besides the elective nature of the ECOSOCC statutes, the institution has also been criticized 
for its lack of autonomy from government influence. When the Interim ECOSOCC General 
Assembly was established in 2005, the institution was headed by the Bureau. This created 
problems as the Bureau’s president at the time, Nobel Laureate Prof. Wangari Maathai, had 
been nominated into this position by the Executive Council rather than being chosen by CSOs. 
Moreover, Maathai was at the time serving as a minister in the Kenyan Government. 
According to civil society leaders, this showed a great disrespect for the institution which had 
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been meant as an independent CSO forum, lacking governmental influence. In reaction to the 
nomination of Maathai, Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem commented: 
“[…] THE AU BUREAUCRATS WANTED HIGH VISIBILITY, SOMEBODY THAT WAS MORE AMENABLE TO THEIR 
OWN CONTROL AND AGENDA AND ACCEPTABLE AND RECOGNIZABLE TO THE HEADS OF STATES […] THE 
WHOLE PROCESS LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF THE ECOSOCC WAS ENGINEERED, CONTROLLED AND 
MANAGED AT EVERY STAGE – EVEN THE ELABORATE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS” (QUOTED ON 
PAMBAZUKA.NET, RETRIEVED ON 05/06/2015) 
The suggestion that states attempt to control the CSOs who qualify for ECOSOCC is confirmed 
in literature (Muchie et al. 2006, 19). The situation in regards to CSO eligibility creates an 
opportunity for member states to select the CSO representatives and ultimately also the policy 
advice produced by ECOSOCC. In addition, Gary (1996) claims that Africa shows strong signs 
of a civil society ‘hijacked’ by self-interested elites and that the idea that civil society in Africa 
is independent is a misplaced image. Rather, independent CSOs in Africa are a rare commodity 
and many CSOs in Africa are closely connected to governments (1996, 163). ‘Hijacked’ civil 
society could provide the perfect vehicle for governments to further their interests through 
the ECOSOCC channel.  
CIDO’s unclear selection procedure in regards to participants for CSO fora and summits adds 
to the concerns regarding ECOSOCC member’s autonomy. According to reports, there have 
been instances where CSOs willing to participate in a forum were denied participation on 
inexplicable terms, while the majority of CSOs present at the forum were mostly CSOs which 
were known for entertaining close relationships with governments (Kane et al. 2007, 31).  
The ability to influence CSO representatives creates a possible benefit for the Member States, 
who can use ECOSOCC as an additional channel to push for their interests in the African Union. 
Seeing that there is a possible power-increasing incentive in the creation of ECOSOCC, it can 
be viewed as a motive for establishing and shaping ECOSOCC according to the neorealist 
theory. 
H2 
To test the second hypothesis, it must be determine which Member State of the African Union 
can be labeled as being the ‘most powerful’. The hierarchical ranking according to neorealism 
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happens in  accordance with state’s power, which encompasses the military, political and 
social-economic capabilities. 
The National Power Index (NPI) is a methodology which calculates index values for economic 
capabilities, military capabilities, population capabilities, technological capabilities, energy 
security and foreign affairs capabilities, and combines them in a formula to create a relatively 
reliable index for National power (Kumar et al. 2012, 3-5; see appendix E for the NPI formula).  
Using this index, we can establish which of the African countries is the most ‘powerful’, as this 
will indicate what country has, according to the Hegemonic Stability Theory, been the most 
influential in shaping the AU. However, data availability forms a problem in this context, and 
no NPI data is available for the preferred range of 2000-2014, the years during which ECOSOCC 
was established, its statutes were designed and the institution was given shape. Calculating 
the NPI for each Member State of the African Union in each of these years is not realistic taking 
into account the complexity with which the data is created and the amount of data required 
to calculate the NPI for each Member State of the African Union. Constrained by this fact, the 
hypothesis can only be tested for one specific year for which there is data available, namely 
2012. 
In 2012, the Foundation for National Security produced a report calculating the NPI for 27 
countries. The selection of countries to be included in the report was made according to 
selection criteria such as a minimum GDP, a minimum expenditure on defense and the 
population size. The researchers found 41 countries meeting the basic selection criteria, and 
subsequently excluded from the list the countries which were of little geopolitical 
consequence (Kumar et al. 2012, 3). The only two African countries remaining in their list were 
Egypt and Nigeria.  
In regards to Egypt, it is important to note that the country did not remain untouched by the 
Arab Spring. Uprisings in Egypt started in 2011 and led to the fall of the Mubarak regime in 
2012. However, the NPI uses factual data for calculating indexes of military investments and 
GDP, which are reliable even in periods of political unrest. Additionally, neorealist theory 
assumes that the behavior of states is influenced by their hierarchical position in the global 
structure and that power is defined as the capabilities of the states, including the criteria 
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upheld in the NPI calculations resulting in a. For these two reasons, Egypt is still regarded as 
one of the main players in Africa, regardless of the Arab Spring.  
Because of the restriction in data availability, literature is additionally consulted. Luckily, Egypt 
and Nigeria are, also in literature, recognized as being two of the main actors responsible for 
shaping and driving the AU. Additionally, literature recognizes South Africa as a key player in 
the establishment the African Union (Kingah & Langenhove 2012, 207). Hence, the 
comparison in the following section will focus on Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. 
The HST assumes that powerful states use cooperative initiatives such as the African Union to 
influence the behavior of other states to create a stable environment in  accordance with their 
own preferences. To determine whether Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa have attempted to 
mirror their personal interests upon the African Union, we must look at both their national 
policies in regard to civil society and the actual situation of civil society in their retrospective 
countries as an indicator of practical application of these interests. Hence, the indicator for 
similarity can be found at two levels: policy and situation.  
The data required for measuring the indicators can be obtained from USAID. USAID is an U.S. 
Government agency which aims to end global poverty and promote resilient, democratic 
societies (USAID.gov, retrieved on 06/06/2015). In this capacity, the agency produces yearly 
reports evaluating different facets of democratic values in countries around the globe. One of 
these facets is civil society representation, which is evaluated in CSO sustainability reports. 
The studies rely on qualitative studies and investigate the conditions for sustainability 
according to seven dimensions of civil society: legal environment, organizational capacity, 
financial viability, infrastructure, public image, advocacy and service provision. Each of these 
dimensions are rated as being either sustainability enhanced, sustainability evolving or 
sustainability impeded (Fox 2012, 4-6). The reports published in 2012, covering both present 
and past information on CSO activity, will form the core of analysis outlaid in the following 
part. 
In its 2012 report, USAID categorized Egypt’s CSO sustainability as impeded in five out of the 
seven dimensions, consequently presenting a very grim image of Egypt’s civil society. 
According to the report, CSOs mostly suffered from extensive legal restrictions as well as 
government harassment and a negative publicity campaign against CSOs (USAID1 2012, 6). 
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After the fall of the Mubarak regime during the Arab Spring in 2012, a new constitution was 
adopted. In contrary to its predecessor, the new constitution provides significant guarantees 
for the freedom of association. However, evidence shows that the constitutional change did 
not result in subsequent policy changes. Rather, the restrictive policies against CSOs which 
had been in place prior to the new constitution were maintained. The Ministry of Social 
Solidarity’s database includes 37.500 CSOs, but it remains unclear how many of these are 
active (USAID1 2012, 5). 
One of the impediments for CSOs in Egypt is the legal framework allowing the Ministry of 
Social Solidarity great discretion in terms of accepting, or refusing, CSOs. Moreover, the 
Ministry has the ability to dissolve CSOs and restrict their operations based on vague grounds 
(USAID1 2012, 6). This policy seems to present a similarity with Article 6.3a of the ECOSOCC 
statutes, which states that only CSOs registered with a Member State can be eligible into 
ECOSOCC. Hence, the power of civil society is heavily restricted by the preferences of the 
Member States, or in this case of Egypt. 
Another striking coincidence between ECOSOCC and Egypt policy concerning civil society is 
the focus on a maximum for the percentage of external funding an eligible CSO can receive. 
Article 6.6 of the ECOSOCC statutes requires CSOs to be funded by at least 50 percent from 
within Africa. In comparison, Egypt has lead a strong campaign against externally funded CSOs 
in the past year, increasingly denying permission to CSOs to receive foreign funding. This 
campaign has been further intensified in 2012 (USAID1 2012, 8). 
Concerning Egypt, there is strong support for the second hypothesis. Especially the external 
funding criteria bear a striking resemblance to ECOSOCC regulations. Additionally, both 
ECOSOCC and Egypt seem to provide structural opportunities for influencing CSO activity: 
ECOSOCC through the eligibility requirements and Egypt through its vague legal framework 
allowing the dissolve CSOs.  
In comparison to Egypt, Nigeria presents a much more positive situation for CSOs, categorizing 
the country as being sustainability evolving in the civil society sector. With 57.000 recorded 
CSOs, Nigeria is the Sub-Saharan country with the largest number of registered CSOs. Besides 
the large amount of CSOs, USAID also states that CSOs operate without significant government 
interferences (USAID2 2012, 2-5). 
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Since democratization happened in 1999, political space for CSOs opened up and the sector 
flourished. CSOs seem to have gained an integrated role in society, as the government shows 
a generally cordial attitudes and often consults with CSOs on many issues.  
CSO registration is regulated by the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990. This 
act involves transparent registration guidelines, enabling easy and quick registration of CSOs. 
In contrast to Egypt, there are no known instances of CSOs being denied registration for 
arbitrary or political reasons. Dissolution of CSOs can only happen through court decisions 
(USAID2 2012, 109). 
Studying the policies and behavior in regards to civil society, the case of Nigeria does not 
produce any similarities between its individual policy goals and the ECOSOCC mandate. 
Therefore it does not seem likely that Nigeria is attempting to enforce its individual 
preferences unto the modeling of ECOSOCC. 
South Africa has the best overall score in terms of CS sustainability according to USAID (USAID2 
2012, 1). Even though CSOs faced financial difficulties as a result of decreased foreign funding, 
the CS is varied and effective. State interference is very small, although the manifold of Acts 
regulating CSOs makes the process of registration transparent but also very lengthy and 
difficult. However, South Africa is one of the few Sub-Saharan countries to have lawyers 
specialized in civil society related law, and the government provides funding for CSO 
organizations (USAID2 2012, 135-6).  
Similarly to the Nigerian case, South Africa presents very little resemblance to ECOSOCC in 
regards to policy and practice. This case does thus not present any support for the second 
hypothesis.  
The second hypothesis has been investigated for three different countries, as the data 
availability constrained the opportunity for presenting a strong enough case in support of one 
AU Member State as being the most powerful one. The NPI for 2012 defined Egypt as Africa’s 
most powerful country in terms of military, socio-economic and political terms, as requested 
by the neorealist school of thought. In contrast, literature suggested a great influence of 
Nigeria and South Africa in the primal years of the AU. For this reason, all three cases were 
studied. 
39 
 
If the NPI for 2012 can be regarded as a good indicator for the power structure of the AU in 
the period between 2000 and 2014, data suggests that Egypt is to be the subject of H2. In this 
case, observations on the policy and practice of ECOSOCC and Egypt show strong similarities, 
hence supporting the hypothesis. 
5.2 The Social Constructivist Perspective 
The assumptions provided by social constructivism were used to deduct two hypothesis to be 
tested in regards of ECOSOCC: 
H3: If social constructivism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment 
of ECOSOCC, the norm of an active and included civil society is a reflection of the same 
norm pre-existing in the Member States of the African Union. 
H4: If social constructivism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment 
of ECOSOCC, the organ has enabled a normative change in the practice of Member 
States in regards to civil society.  
An important assumption in the constructivist theory is that norms, which adhere to a logic of 
appropriateness, are responsible for shaping behavior. Additionally, social constructivism 
assumes that frequent intercourse in cooperative initiatives can lead to norm changes in 
actors. Investigating whether the logic of appropriateness has been a motive behind the 
establishment of ECOSOCC can be done in two ways, each corresponding to one of the 
hypothesis. To answer H1, we must start by establishing whether or not the norm for civil 
society participation was regarded as the appropriate norm within the AU Member States, 
consequently resulting in the norm flowing into ECOSOCC. H2, in contrast, follows the 
assumption that cooperation within an organization supporting a certain norm can enhance 
norm change amongst actors in favor of the organization’s norm.  
Thus, in order to verify the hypothesis, we must look at which norms existed when ECOSOCC 
was called into life, as well as how norms have changed since its establishment. Moreover, 
seeing as constructivism is a state-centric theory, the units of research in this section must be 
states. Establishing whether or not the norms were present in the Member States shall be 
done using data from Freedom House. 
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Freedom House is an independent organization which aims at increasing freedom around the 
world. It functions as a supervisory body and an advocate for citizen empowerment. Amongst 
scholars, the organization is probably most famous for its extensive databases on topics of 
democracy, freedom and society (freedomhouse.org1, retrieved on 06/06/2015). 
Since 1972, the organization publishes its anual flagship report ‘Freedom in the World’, which 
offers a comparative assessment of civil and political rights in over 195 countries around the 
globe. Using a detailed assessment, Freedom House scores each country for Political Freedom 
and Civil Liberty. The publication is made available to everyone on their website. However, 
not all data used for their publication is available for all years since the first publication. For 
example, the sub-scores for each surveyed category have only been made available for the 
last ten years.  
Freedom House uses a scale of 0 to 7 to assess each country’s Political Freedom and Civil 
Liberty. The scale of political freedom is based on 40 indicators, while the civil society scale 
employs 60 different indicators. The indicators are grouped together to form subcategories 
each drawn from the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and representing a fundamental 
freedom. These categories are: free and legitimate elections; free participation in the electoral 
process; accountability of representatives; freedom of expression and belief; freedom of 
assembly and association; presence of a rule of law and individual rights and freedoms 
(freedomhouse.org2, retrieved on 06/06/2015).  
The scoring of civil liberties is established by awarding a score for each of the 15 civil liberty 
indicators. The indicators are questions grouped into four subcategories: freedom of 
expression and belief; associational and organizational rights; rule of law and personal 
autonomy and individual rights (see appendix F for a complete list of questions). The total of 
these indicator corresponds to a certain value indicating a country’s civil liberties, also called 
the Freedom Rating. The rating in turn, establishes the status of each country as follows: 1.0 
to 2.5 for ‘Free’, 3.0 to 5.0 for ‘Partly Free’ and 5.5 to 7.0 for ‘Not Free’.  
A rating of ‘1’ in Civil Liberty means that a country enjoys a wide range of civil liberties 
including the freedoms of expression, assembly, association, education and religion. There is 
an established an just legal system to ensure rule of law and other freedoms such as equality 
of opportunity. A rating of ’2’ means that there exist some impediments to civil liberties such 
41 
 
as limits on media independence, restrictions on trade unions and problems with minority 
rights and/or women. Countries with a rating between ‘3’ and ‘5’ are either moderate 
protectors of civil liberties or have strong preferences for certain civil liberties while 
disregarding others. Countries with a rating of ‘6’ have restricted civil liberties, such as limited 
rights of expression and association and limited religious and social freedoms. Countries with 
the highest score of ‘7’ are countries with none or only very few civil liberties. Freedom of 
expression and association is approximately non-existent and states control or dominate most 
of the economic activities (Freedomhouse.org3, retrieved on 06/06/2015). 
H3 
If behavior of states follow norms, and norms follow the logic of appropriateness as assumed 
by social constructivism, than policy alone is not an indicator for the presence or absence of a 
norm. Rather, a norms need to be embedded in society and thus be reflected in a state’s 
general practices. If states believe in the ‘appropriateness’ of a certain behavior, or in other 
words that it is the ‘right thing to do’, policy without integration is not possible. For this reason, 
the Freedom Rating should be a good indicator of the presence, or absence, of the norm of 
civil society representation in the AU Member States.  
Amongst the data available on the Freedom House website, we can find a list of aggregated 
scores of civil liberty, as determined by the method outlaid above, for each individual state in 
the period 1972 to 2013. From the available dataset, I have selected all the African Union 
Member States except for the Democratic Arab Republic of Saharawi, also known as Western 
Sahara, which does not appear in the dataset. Data for South Sudan is available from 2012 
onwards, after the state was officially recognized as an independent entity. From the selected 
data, a new set was created showing the average score for the AU Member States for each 
consecutive year. This data is shown in graph 5.1. 
The data used for creating graph 5.1 can be found in appendix G. The complete dataset 
including the Freedom Ratings per country can be found in appendix H.  
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A few observations can be made from graph 5.1. Firstly, the data shows that in average, civil 
liberties in Africa over the entire period is ranked as partly free at best as it never reaches 
below 4. Secondly, the graph shows a small but positive change in favor of civil liberty 
throughout the years. From 1986 onwards the average civil liberty score for African Union 
members dropped from a 5.7 in 1986 to a 4.5 in 1991 . After shortly rising again to 4.9 1994, 
the average civil liberty score declined again until 2004 to 4.1, after which a gradual rise is 
seen until 2014, where the average reaches a score of 4.4.  
According to Akokpari et al. (2008), the Heads of States and Governments, to a large extent, 
agreed with the necessity of a people-centered AU when they agreed to establish ECOSOCC 
in the Constitutive Act of the AU in 2000. Additionally, they claim that the need for a CS in the 
development of Africa was generally recognized (2008, 291-2). This attitude corresponds with 
the Freedom House data, as the CS liberties had slowly been declining prior to 2000, which 
indicates a change in the norm favoring Civil Society. 
The increase in civil liberties between 1986 and 1990 also corresponds to the establishment 
of the Arusha Charter, implying the positive change in the data corresponds to a positive 
change in attitude, or norm, in favor of civil society in AU Member States. The Arusha Charter 
is a document established by the OAU which claims the importance of civil society for the 
development a Africa. The document states: 
[ Graph 5.1: Average of aggregated Civil Liberty Score of AU Member 
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“WE FURTHERMORE OBSERVE THAT GIVEN THE CURRENT WORLD POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION, 
AFRICA IS BECOMING FURTHER MARGINALIZED IN WORLD AFFAIRS, BOTH GEO-POLITICALLY AND 
ECONOMICALLY. AFRICAN COUNTRIES MUST REALIZE THAT, MORE THAN EVER BEFORE, THEIR GREATEST 
RESOURCE IS THEIR PEOPLE AND THAT IT IS THROUGH THEIR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION THAT AFRICA CAN 
SURMOUNT THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LIE AHEAD.” (ARUSHA CHARTER 1990, 5). 
The process of establishing the ECOSOCC statutes, which in due course defined the 
institution’s mandate, began in 2000 and ended in 2005 when the statutes were accepted by 
the Assembly. During this period, the average civil liberty score improved marginally from 4.5 
in 2000 to 4.1 in 2005. It was previously discussed how the statutes severely limit the ability 
of ECOSOCC to function properly, especially because of the restrictions to CSO autonomy. In 
this regard, a change in average attitude towards civil society in Africa does not correspond to 
the drafting of restrictive statutes for the institution.  
It must be recognized, however, that even though the data shows a positive change in attitude 
regarding civil liberties in AU members states, the change is rather limited and therefor it could 
alternatively be argued that the amount of change is not sufficient to constitute a norm 
change, but rather a mere improvement or slow move in the direction of a new norm.  
If positive norm change was to be defined as the transition from one categorization to 
another, e.g. from ‘Not Free’ to ‘Partly Free’ or from ‘Partly Free’ to ‘Free’, only six out of 52 
countries (excluding South Sudan) would satisfy the definition in the period between 2000 and 
2014. Four other countries in this period experienced a decrease unto a lower category and 
the remaining 42 countries remain in the same category (see table in appendix H). Thus, in 
these terms the hypothesis can not be supported. 
Observations of trends in attitude towards civil society in African Union Member States does 
not support the third hypothesis. While a change in norms according to the Freedom House 
data corresponds to the drafting of the Arusha Charter in 1990, the subsequent trends do not 
match the events surrounding ECOSOCC. Firstly, the establishment of ECOSOCC in the AU 
charter in 2000 followed a period wherein the general attitude towards civil liberties in Africa 
decrease, which presents a first. Secondly, the drafting of restrictive statutes for ECOSOCC 
between 2000 and 2005 was simultaneously accompanied by a small increase in civil liberties, 
again not falling in line with expectations raised by the hypothesis. 
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While the descripted trends in data seem to be only marginal, the definition of norm change 
not as a process but defined as a change in a country’s liberty status according to Freedom 
House reinforces the observation. Therefore, H3 cannot be accepted. 
H4 
The second hypothesis drawn from the constructivist perspective follows the assumption that 
through frequent cooperation, actors will take over the norms prominent within he 
cooperative initiative. In this respect, it would mean that the norm which promotes a positive 
attitude towards civil society, as exerted in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and 
expressed through the establishment of ECOSOCC, should be reflected on the Member States 
of the organization. 
To research whether states have been influenced by the norm promoting a positive attitude 
towards civil society in the AU, I have created a dataset compiled of country-specific data from 
Freedom House. Every year between 2006 and 2015, Freedom House published detailed data 
including the scores awarded for the sub-categories of each rating. One of the subcategories 
used by Freedom House to rate civil liberty is the sub-category Associational and 
Organizational Rights. This sub-category is defined according to indicators in the form of 
questions regarding (1) the freedom of assembly, demonstration and public discussion, (2) the 
freedom of NGOs and (3) the existence of trade unions, peasant, professional and private 
organizations or equivalents and the possibility of collective bargaining (Freedomhouse.org3, 
retrieved on 06/06/2015; see appendix F for the complete list of questions as provided by 
Freedom House). Summarized, this sub-category scores the opportunities for civil society to 
develop and exist within a country.  
From the data, I have distilled all the sub-scores for Associational and Organizational Rights of 
every AU Member State, except for the Democratic Arab Republic of Saharawi, and calculated 
the average for all the AU Member States (the table including this dataset can be found in 
appendix I). Finally, the data was used to create graph 5.2. Contrary to the Freedom Score, 
this data employs a positive scale 0 to 12. This means that a higher score on the scale means 
a better position for civil society in the Member State(s). 
The decreasing trend in graph 5.2 is very obvious. Except for two short periods during which 
the average civil society opportunities increased between 2006-2007 and 2011-2012, it 
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generally paints a grim picture of the prospects of civil society opportunities in Africa. It should 
be noted, however, that the scoring for this sub-category happens on a scale of 1 to 12 and 
the graph only displays the range 5.4-6.6, meaning the effect is optically magnified on the 
vertical scale. For this reason, the graph paints appears more negative than when the entire 
scale was to be displayed. To illustrate, the total difference between the averages in 2006 and 
2015 are 0,6 point, which only accounts for a decrease of 10 percent over ten years. 
 
 
If we look at the numbers of each individual country, the negative outlook perseveres. From 
the 53 states in the dataset, only 8 show an increase in the Associational and Organizational 
Rights indicator in contrast to 26 countries showing a deterioration. The remaining 19 
countries received the same score in 2015 as in 2006.  
From the data, an increase in the positive attitude towards civil society cannot be observed as 
the data shows an overall decrease of civil society opportunities in AU Member States. Even 
though we have to take into account the relatively young age of ECOSOCC, from a 
constructivist perspective we would assume to see an improvement in civil society 
opportunities in the AU Member States, or in a scenario were the short time-span would be 
of influence, at least a generally stable trend in this regard. However, both the average 
numbers as well as the amount of states which have had a decreasing score for the 
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Associational and Organizational Rights indicator point out that this is not the case. Therefore, 
there is no support for H4 and the hypotheses cannot be accepted. 
5.3 The Sociological institutionalist perspective 
The assumptions brought forth by institutionalism have steered the development of two 
hypothesis aiming at testing this theoretical perspective: 
H5: If sociological institutionalism is the correct approach to understanding the 
establishment of ECOSOCC, the organ has been created in accordance with a global 
cultural model favoring a positive attitude towards civil society, while not necessarily 
reflecting the attitudes of the Member States. 
H6: If sociological institutionalism is the correct approach to understanding the 
establishment of ECOSOCC, the rhetorical setup of the organ does not correspond to 
the subsequent practice of the policies included therein. 
In order to verify the theoretical perspective, we must first establish whether an improved 
role for civil society is viewed as a global culture. According to institutionalism’s logic of good 
faith and confidence, states adopt acclaimed models and replicate them, without necessarily 
agreeing with their content. In this regards, three circumstances are expected to occur: (1) the 
normative civil society framework is regarded as a global culture, (2) the global culture is not 
a feature of AU Member States’s national cultures and (3) the model belonging to this global 
culture has been mirrored in the AU model. This will form the basis for the evaluation of the 
first hypothesis.  
The second hypothesis for institutionalism follows the theory of decoupling. Decoupling is a 
result of states adopting models without having the intention of bringing the model into 
practice, or not being able to as the context onto which the model is copied is not appropriate. 
To test the hypothesis, it must therefore be established whether there is a discrepancy 
between ECOSOCC in rhetorical terms and ECOSOCC in practice.  
H5 
Civil society is defined in literature as ‘the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-
generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by legal order or 
set of shared rules’ (Diamond 1994, 5). Civil society functions as a channel for people to 
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influence policy, by channeling general concerns and demands from interest groups, such as 
minority groups, thereby adding a normative component to debates (Kamstra 2004, 21). In 
the strong words enounced by Secretary General Kofi Anan, NGOs function as “the conscience 
of humanity” (quoted in Malone 2004, 374).  
The two main functions of civil society are its task as a watchdog for democracy, scrutinizing 
abuse of state power and its mission to encourage broader participation of society in public 
matters. As a result of these functions, civil society is seen as a necessary element to ensure 
governmental accountability and transparency as well as to increase a state’s capacity for 
good governance and rule of law (Mercer 2002, 7; Diamond 1994, 5; Leyachi 1995, 186). The 
presence of good governance and rule of law, in turn, legitimizes the authority of states 
(Diamond 1994, 7). These assertions in regard to the importance of civil society as a 
requirement for state legitimacy flourished in the liberal democratic ideology which was 
flourishing in the post-Cold War era (Makinda & Okumu 2008, 31). As a result, an increasing 
number of regional organizations started incorporating these ideals into their constitutions 
(Maluwa 2012, 38). The inclusion of civil society had become a ‘global culture’. 
In Africa, this global culture was already recognized in Africawith the adoption of the Arusha 
Charter by the OAU in 1990. The charter, more specifically, claimed civil society was required 
to regain a place in world affairs – notably geo-politically and economically (Arusha Charter 
1990, 5).  
In order to assess the national culture of AU Member States, data from Freedom House can 
be used. In chapter 5.2, it was established that civil liberties in the AU Member States are in 
average quite poor. In 2000, the year the AU was formally established, the average civil liberty 
score of the Member States of the African Union was a mere 4.5 on a scale of 0 – 7 wherein a 
‘0’ indicates great liberty and ‘7’ no liberty. A 4.5 officially ranks as ‘Partly Free’ in the Freedom 
Score, but is way above the minimum score (2) required for gaining a categorization as ‘Free’. 
Furthermore, if we look at the scoring on the civil liberty scale per country, we can observe 
that from the 53 countries available in the data, only 5 are defined as ‘Free’, while 33 fit the 
category ‘Partly Free’ and 15 are categorized as ‘Not Free’ (data available in appendix H).  
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Thus, these observations do not support the presence of a positive national culture towards 
civil society. They do however, support the assumption of the presence of a global culture 
regarding civil society.  
According to sociological institutionalism and the logic of confidence and good faith, global 
cultures are copied by actors in order to gain legitimacy because the global culture is ‘generally 
accepted’. Moreover, states who want to be accepted into the system are required to employ 
these cultures in order to be regarded as legitimate entities permitted to participate in the 
system. According to sociological institutionalism, this expectancy results in the adoption of 
the matching models but are not implemented as they often don’t fit with the context or 
national culture of the state adopting it.  
Literature supports the claim that the AU was modeled after the flagship of integrated liberal 
democratic ideologies: the European Union. Imitation of the EU was encouraged by globalism 
and resulted in aspirations from African leaders to establish a continental body which mirrored 
the European Union and its features (Makinda & Okumu 2008, 35; Maluwa 2012, 38).  
On paper, the AU shows striking similarities to the EU, especially in its architecture. The AU’s 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government is comparable to the EU’s European Council, the 
AU’s Executive Council is very similar to the EU’s General Affairs Council, the AU’s Committee 
of Permanent Representatives is akin to the EU’s Permanent Representatives Committee and 
the AU’s ECOSOCC is the EU’s Economic and Social Committee. Furthermore, the two 
organizations have the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Parliament in common 
(Babarinde 2007, 8-9). 
The influence of the European model on the shaping of the AU has not been hidden by those 
involved in its establishment. For example, President Gaddafi admitted that the inspiration for 
the AU had been drawn from the EU. Similarly, references were made at the Lusaka summit 
in 2001 to the AU ‘being loosely based on the European model (au2002.gov, retrieved on 
07/06/2015; Babarinde 2007, 8).  
In observing the different indicators for H5, it can be recognized that there is strong support 
for the fifth hypotheses. Firstly, it was established that civil society participation for 
governmental legitimacy, especially with the rise of the liberal democratic ideologies, 
constitutes a global culture. From Freedom House data, it was furthermore established that 
49 
 
the lack of civil liberties in most of the AU member states points out that the attitude towards 
civil society does not match this global culture, and finally that the AU model was designed in  
accordance with liberal democracy’s flagship intergovernmental organization: the EU. From 
these observations, H5 can easily be accepted. 
H6 
Using the example of AU reluctance to invoke its right of intervention in Darfur and Sudan, 
Maluwa (2012) points out that the AU does not inspire confidence in its willingness to fulfill 
the promises in regards to human rights, democracy and good governance as enshrined in the 
AU Constitutive Act. Maluwa continues with asking the very poignant questions, which are at 
the heart of this paper’s sixth hypothesis:  
“DOES THE AU TRULY REPRESENT A QUALITATIVE CHANGE AND TRANSITION FROM THE OLD TO THE NEW? IS 
THE AU INDEED READY TO GO BEYOND LIP SERVICE AND APPLY THE NEW NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK PROVIDED 
BY THE CONSTITUTIVE ACT AND OTHER RELATED LEGAL INSTRUMENTS TO FACE THE CURRENT AND FUTURE 
CHALLENGES FACING THE CONTITENT?” (MALUWA 2012, 46).  
A report published by the Center for Conflict Studies in 2005, expresses similar concerns when 
it implies that the AU needs to improve and better implement its structures if it truly desires 
to work together with civil society. According to their survey of the AU, the objectives which 
motivated the establishment of ECOSOCC are severely impaired by the lack of respect for the 
institution amongst African leaders (Murithi & Ndinga-Muvumba 2005, 11). 
Also civil society actors have expressed a growing concern, stating that the original enthusiasm 
with which the establishment of ECOSOCC was met had given way for a more pessimistic view: 
“[..] MANY STAFF SEEMED TO RETAIN THEIR OLD HABITS AND ATTITUDES. THERE ARE STILL CONSIDERABLE 
DIFFICULTIES IN OTAINING ACCESS TO INFORMATION ABOUT POLICIES AND DOCUMENTS UNDER 
DISCUSSION BY AU ORGANS, PREVENTING EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION BY AFRICA’S CITIZENS IN 
CONTINENTAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES” (KANE ET AL. 2007, 1). 
Additionally, Kane et al. (2007) warn that the legal framework and institutional arrangements 
of ECOSOCC need to be simplified and improved in order to increase the effectiveness of the 
organ (2007, 2). These concerns and questions point in the direction of a gap between 
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ECOSOCC’s stated motives, which was to become a people-driven organization through the 
establishment of ECOSOCC and PAP, and the current practice of the organization. 
To define whether ECOSOCC fulfills its promise to involved civil society through ECOSOCC, the 
intentions given for creating the institution must be established an compared to the practical 
implementation. 
One of the objectives stated in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act is to “promote and defend 
African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples” (AU 
Constitutive Act, 5). The principles outlaid in the following Article further denotes that the Au 
shall function in  accordance with the principle of “participation of the African peoples in the 
activities of the Union” (AU Constitutive Act, 6). These ideals were given shape in the 
establishment of PAP and ECOSOCC, which were to have the function of becoming the 
representatives for participation of the African peoples. This aim is in  accordance with the 
global culture of an involved civil society which came hand in hand with the flourishing ideals 
of liberal democracy. 
In practice however, the interests of the people and their ability to participate is not as 
idealistic as the goals from Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act. ECOSOCC, as was noted 
before, was originally invoked in Article 22 the Constitutive Act of the AU. The specific article 
contains only two clauses: 
“1. THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL COUNCIL SHALL BE AN ADVISORY ORGAN COMPOSED OF 
DIFFERENT SOCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL GROUPS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE UNION.  
2. THE FUNCTIONS, POWERS, COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL COUNCIL SHALL BE DETERMINED BY THE ASSEMBLY.” (AU CONSTITUTIVE ACT, 15). 
While not being a very elaborate Article, one important observation is that Article 22.1 
establishes ECOSOCC solely as an advisory organ. In accordance, while Article 22.2 mentions 
that the powers of ECOSOCC shall be determined by the Assembly, the practical power of the 
institution is already set in Article 22.1 and the Assembly cannot change this. While the 
statutes of ECOSOCC can easily be amended and do not require long and difficult procedures 
due to set protocols (Kane et al. 2007, 33), the possibility for ECOSOCC to become more than 
a mere advisory body of the AU does not fall under this same reasoning as it requires a 
constitutional amendment: a process much harder to fulfill. 
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This information is in line with the critique the AU has received for ECOSOCC. Muchie et al. 
(2006) for example conclude that the institutionalization of civil society is not sufficient to be 
of any real influence within the AU (2006: 20). Similarly, Makinda and Okumu place big 
question marks behind the amount of power that states are willing to give to the people 
through institutions such as ECOSOCC (2008: 35). 
When looking at the further mandate of ECOSOCC as defined by its statutes, we can observe 
more discrepancy between rhetoric and practice. As discussed before, the ECOSOCC statutes 
include several clauses that are severely restrictive to CSO eligibility, i.e. the requirement of a 
minimum funding originating from its own members, and the requirement that CSOs are 
registered with one of the Member States. These clauses are constraints on the autonomy of 
ECOSOCC members as they enable governmental influence over CSOs in the institution. As the 
autonomy of CSOs is a requirement for an effective civil society (Kamstra 2014, 26; Mercer 
2002, 7), these restriction are very derogating for ECOSOCC’s ability to function properly, as 
CSOs might no longer be the ‘voice of the people’, but rather the ‘puppets of governments’. 
The problem regarding the autonomy of participating CSOs is further aggravated by 
ECOSOCC’s dependence on CIDO and the vague selection criteria they uphold (Akokpari et al. 
2008, 298-301; Kane et al. 2007, 6). This is very well illustrated by the reports reciting how civil 
society leaders could not participate in CSO summits because they were denied the required 
visa to enter the into the host country, as a result of host government’s desire to exclude CSOs 
from participation. 
Practice at the national level does not show large support for the implementation of a 
normative civil society framework either. Little evidence was found that steps had been taken 
by Member States to create the institutions needed for the functioning of ECOSOCC. 
Furthermore, a significant absence of efforts by the Member States to engage civil society in 
decision making is persevering (Kane et al. 2007, 2).  
While the statutes of ECOSOCC were adopted already in 2005, knowledge about the organ 
among civil society in Africa is generally low. Kane et al. point out this problem already in a 
report published in 2007 (p. 6), but the problem is further illustrated by the need for the 
Bureau to extend the election deadline for ECOSOCC members twice in 2013 and 2014. 
Consequently, the end result of the elections are not very hopeful: ECOSOCC is at the present 
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comprised of only 64 out of the possible 150 members (CCR 2012, 26; Akokpari et al. 2008, 
303). 
The ECOSOCC General Assembly was only elected in December 2014, and did not have much 
time to prove what ECOSOCC is worth in practice. The Interim General Assembly which steered 
the institution prior to these elections has been mostly busy with preparing the elections of 
the General Assembly and sensitization missions in order to raise the amount of applications 
to the elections. Additionally, the institution is still working on creating its foundation. The 
problem of the small representation in the General Assembly is also very problematic: roughly 
two thirds of the available seats remain empty.As a result, ECOSOCC has called for new 
elections and is currently taking applications until 31 December 2015 (www.au.int7, retrieved 
on 07/06/2015). 
The observations show a strong support for the presence of decoupling the case of ECOSOCC. 
There is much critique toward ECOSOCC for not fulfilling its envisioned promise as an 
institution. The Article responsible for the establishment of the institution restricts its power 
to a mere advisory role, and the statutes and structure of the institution allow opportunities 
for member states to influence which CSOs are represented, creating an impediment for the 
ideal of autonomous CSOs. Moreover, the little amount of knowledge of ECOSOCC among civil 
society, together with the lack of publicity and structural arrangements by the member states 
has resulted in a relatively small amount of applications and even smaller amount of eligible 
members for the ECOSOCC General Assembly, which is currently comprised of only 52 CSO 
representatives instead of the intended 150. Member states have shown no imperatives to 
contribute to the strengthening of the organization and even seem to lack respect for it. So 
far, the institution has not been able to achieve much of its intended goals. For these reasons, 
H6 can be accepted. 
The overall findings of this analysis will be discussed in chapter 6.  
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6. Discussion 
The results from the application of the three theories on ECOSOCC in the previous chapter 
show the most support for the theoretical perspectives of neorealism and sociological 
institutionalism. In contrast, neither of the two hypothesis deduced from social constructivism 
were supported by observations from the case study. Both prior to and after the 
establishment of ECOSOCC the lack of norm improvement in regards to CSOs shows very little 
backing for the social constructivist assumption that norms enhance behavioral change and 
vice versa. Consequently, both constructivist hypothesis were rejected and the perspective 
was ruled out. 
Realism shows strong support for both its hypothesis. ECOSOCC is structured in such a way 
that member states have opportunities enabling selectivity and manipulating the CSOs in 
ECOSOCC, hence gaining an extra voice in the institution. Additionally, the observations 
showed great similarities between policies and practices of ECOSOCC and Egypt, the AU’s most 
powerful state according to neorealist standards. Both these hypothesis show that strong 
power-increasing incentives existed to motivate the establishment of ECOSOCC and influence 
the way it has been structured. 
The two hypothesis for testing the appropriateness of sociological institutionalism in 
explaining why ECOSOCC could both be accepted. Evidence was provided showing how civil 
society erupted as a global culture part of the neo-liberal democracy ideals which flourished 
in the post-Cold War era. The normative civil society framework is seen as a necessity for 
legitimizing authority of governments, and can therefore be categorized as a global culture. 
The sharp contrast between the AU as an institution supporting global culture and the national 
culture of AU member states which does not support global culture further supports the 
nationalist assumptionsAdditionally, there is strong evidence to show that the AU model is 
copied from the EU, which is often seen as the flagship of liberal democracy, which further 
supports these assumptions. The second hypothesis used to test the theory considered the 
gap between rhetoric and practice, also called decoupling. The case study showed much 
support for this hypothesis as well. 
Neorealism and sociological institutionalism show some parallels as well. Decoupling, for 
example, is also visible in the case study of Egypt of which the observations support the 
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neorealist theory. Additionally, the acquisition of legitimacy through the adoption of global 
cultures can form an incentive for states according to the neorealist theory, as the legitimacy 
of authority gained through the rhetorical adoption of the model could raise the influence for 
the organization and its units on the international stage. As these theoretical perspectives 
address different levels of analysis, they show a complementary, rather than a competing, 
nature. It seems, therefore, that the establishment of ECOSOCC can best be explained by a 
combination of neorealism and sociological institutionalism.    
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7. Conclusion 
The research question ‘which theoretical perspective best explains the creation of the 
Economic, Cultural and Social Council in the African Union?’ is the foundation of this research. 
In order to answer this question three different perspectives, each originating from a different 
theoretical schools of thought, were used to study the establishment and practice of 
ECOSOCC. Each of the theories employ different assumptions in order to describe why certain 
thing happen and others don’t. Neorealism is based on assumptions of an anarchic world in 
which self-interested states compete for power, and that their position in the international 
structure is what defines the behavior of states. In contrast, the social constructivist view 
assumes that it is not the need for power, but norms and the logic of appropriateness that 
shape state behavior. Finally, sociological institutionalism assumes that global cultures shape 
how states present themselves, but that decoupling between rhetoric and practice is a 
necessary consequence because national and global cultures do not fit correctly.  
In order to test the neorealist perspective on the case of ECOSOCC, we looked for the presence 
of possible power-related incentives in the creation of the institution. Secondly, the national 
practices in regards to civil societies of the most powerful/influential AU member states were 
compared with the policies of ECOSOCC. This helped determine whether these states are using 
ECOSOCC in order to influence the behavior of those in their sphere of influence, as expected 
by the neorealist hegemonic stability theory. In regards to the first hypothesis, observations 
supported the presence of power-increasing incentives as a possible incentive for states to 
create ECOSOCC and shape its structures as they currently are. The second hypothesis was 
also strongly supported by the case study as Egypt, which meets the definition of most 
powerful Member State of the AU, has very similar policies and practices in regards to civil 
society as the AU. 
The social constructivism theory was tested following its norm-based assumptions. According 
to this theory, state behavior is influenced by norms and the logic of appropriateness at the 
national level. Additionally, frequent intercourse between actors in a cooperative initiative 
propagating a certain norm should result in a positively change of this norm at the national 
level. Hence, this perspective was applied by testing the indicators determining the adoption 
of the global culture as a contradiction to national culture and according to decoupling. In 
contrast to neorealism this case study showed no support for either one of its hypotheses, as 
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the indicators for norm changes did not correspond between the Member States and 
ECOSOCC. 
Sociological institutionalism was tested according to its logic of good faith and confidence and 
decoupling theory. The logic of good faith and confidence assumes that states copy 
international models which adhere to global cultures in order to gain legitimacy in the 
international system, while the systems don’t necessarily fit the national context or culture. 
Additionally, decoupling assumes that as a result of the previous assumption, a gap between 
rhetoric and practice of policy evolves within these copied systems. Both hypothesis for this 
perspective were strongly supported by the case analysis. The normative civil society 
framework can be regarded as a global norm and the AU has been, at least in parts, copied 
from the European Union while at the same time being in sharp contrast with the AU Member 
States national cultures and contexts. Accordingly, the adoption of this global structure shows 
great discrepancy with the application of the civil society norm which was rhetorically adopted 
in the AU constitutive Act, thereby further supporting the sociological institutionalist 
perspective.  
While both neorealism and sociological institutionalism present a strong case for explaining 
the establishment of ECOSOCC, the theories need not be regarded as contradictory but rather 
as complementary perspectives using two different levels of analysis. Together, neorealism 
and sociological institutionalism seem to best explain the creation of ECOSOCC in the African 
Union. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Objectives of the African Union, as stipulated in Article 3 of the 
Constitutive Act 
 
Article 3 
Objectives 
The objectives of the Union shall be to:  
(a)  achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;  
(b)  defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;  
(c)  accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;  
(d)  promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its  
peoples;  
(e)  encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United  
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;  
(f)  promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;  
(g)  promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;   
(h)  promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on  
Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;  
(i)  establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the  
global economy and in international negotiations;  
(j)   promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the  
integration of African economies;  
(k)  promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African 
peoples;  
(l)  coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic 
Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union;  
(m)  advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in 
science and technology; 
(n)  work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the 
promotion of good health on the continent.  
 
(AU Constitutive Act, 5-6) 
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Appendix B: Principles of the African Union, as stipulated in Article 4 of the 
Constitutive Act 
 
Article 4 
Principles 
The Union shall function in accordance with the following principles:  
(a)  sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union;  
(b)  respect of borders existing on achievement of independence;  
(c)  participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union;  
(d)  establishment of a common defence policy for the African Continent;  
(e)  peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of the Union through such appropriate  
means as may be decided upon by the Assembly;  
(f)  prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union;  
(g)  non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another;  
(h)  the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly 
in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;  
(i)  peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and security;  
(j)  the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace 
and security;  
(k)  promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union;  
(l)  promotion of gender equality;  
(m)  respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance;  
(n)  promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development;  
(o)  respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political 
assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities;  
(p)  condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments. 
 
(AU Constitutive Act, 6-7) 
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Appendix C: Article 22 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
 
Article 22 
The Economic, Social and Cultural Council 
1. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council shall be an advisory organ composed of different social 
and professional groups of the Member States of the Union.  
2. The functions, powers, composition and organization of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council 
shall be determined by the Assembly.  
 
(AU Constitutive Act, 15) 
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Appendix D: Eligibility requirements for membership to ECOSOCC, as stipulated in 
Article 6 of the Statutes of ECOSOCC 
 
Article 6 
Eligibility Requirements for Membership 
The requirements to be fulfilled by CSOs seeking membership are as follows:  
1. Be national, regional, continental or African Diaspora CSO, without restriction to undertake 
regional or international activities.  
2. Have objectives and principles that are consistent with the principles and objectives of the 
Union as set out in Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act.  
3. Registration and status:  
a. Be registered in a Member State of the Union and/or;  
b. Meet the general conditions of eligibility for the granting of Observer Status to non-
governmental organizations;  
c. Show a minimum of three (3) years proof of registration as either an African or an 
African Diaspora CSO prior to the date of submission of application, including proof 
of operations for those years.  
4. Provide annual audit statements by an independent auditing company.  
5. Show proof that the ownership and management of the CSO is made up of not less than fifty 
(50%) of Africans or of African Diaspora.  
6. The basic resources of such an Organisation shall substantially, at least fifty percent (50%), be 
derived from contributions of the members of the Organization. Where external voluntary 
contributions have been received, their amounts and donors shall be faithfully revealed in 
the application for membership. Any financial or other support or contribution, direct or 
indirect, from a government to the Organization shall be declared and fully recorded in the 
financial records of the Organization. 
7. Provide information on funding sources in the preceding three (3) years. 
8. For regional and continental CSOs, show proof of activities that engage or are operative in at 
least three (3) Member States of the Union.  
9. CSOs that discriminate on the basis of religion, gender, tribe, ethnic, racial or political basis 
shall be barred from representation to ECOSOCC;  
10. Adherence to a Code of Ethics and Conduct for civil society organizations affiliated to or 
working with the Union. 
 
(ECOSOCC statutes, 6-7) 
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Appendix E: National Power Index calculation method 
 
The formula for calculating the value of the sub-indexes of the NPI on a positive scale (higher value 
means greater strength) from 0 to 100, is as follows: 
 
 
Within each sub-index, the different indicators used are in the following weightage: 
 
 
 
  
(Retrieved from Kumar et al. 2012, page 
(Retrieved from Kumar et al. 2012, pages 4 & 
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Appendix F: Indicator questions for Freedom House scoring of Civil Liberties 
 
Civil Liberties 
Freedom of Expression and Belief 
1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression?  (Note: 
In cases where the media are state controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the 
survey gives the system credit.) 
1. 2.Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and express 
themselves in public and private? 
2. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political 
indoctrination? 
3. 4.Is there open and free private discussion? 
 
Associational and Organizational Rights 
1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? 
2. Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations?  (Note: This includes civic 
organizations, interest groups, foundations, etc.) 
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there 
effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private 
organizations? 
Rule of Law 
1. Is there an independent judiciary? 
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters?  Are police under direct 
civilian control? 
3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, 
whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and 
insurgencies? 
4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the 
population? 
 
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights 
1. Do citizens enjoy freedom of travel or choice of residence, employment, or institution 
of higher education? 
2. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses?  Is private 
business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, 
political parties/organizations, or organized crime? 
3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage 
partners, and size of family? 
4. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?  
 
(Freedomhouse.org3, retrieved on 06/06/2015) 
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Appendix G: Average aggregated Civil Liberty Freedom Rating of AU member states 
1972-2013 - table 
 
 
(Freedomhouse.org2, retrieved on 06/06/2015) 
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Appendix H: Aggregated Civil Liberty Freedom Rating of AU member states 1972-2013 
per country breakdown - table 
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Scoring is on a negative scale from 0 to 7: 
RED: Not Free (6-7) 
YELLOW: Partly Free (3-5) 
GREEN: Free (1-2) 
(WHITE: missing data) 
(Freedomhouse.org2, retrieved on 06/06/2015) 
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Appendix I: Freedom house scoring of the indicator for Associational and 
Organizational rights per AU member state 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Freedom House scoring for Associational and Organizational rights happens on a positive scale of 0 
(rights are completely respected) to 12 (rights are completely disrespected). 
(Freedomhouse.org2, retrieved on 06/06/2015) 
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